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Federalism Friction in the First Year of the
Trump Presidency
by VIKRAM DAVID AMAR*
Over the last twelve months or so, federalism principles have been
repeatedly invoked by state and local governments in a range of lawsuits and
legislative proposals seeking to block or temper federal policy initiatives
emanating from the new administration of President Donald Trump.1 While
federalism doctrines crafted by the Supreme Court have been successfully
deployed over the past few decades to stymie liberal policies,2 the most
salient lawsuits and legislative innovations in 2017 were engineered by blue
states and cities against the administration to challenge more conservative
agenda items, such as the President's series of executive orders regarding
entry into the U.S. from various foreign nations,3 the elimination of so-called
* Dean and Iwan Foundation Professor of Law, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
College of Law.
1. While other researchers have begun to document the high number of lawsuits and other
acts of state/local defiance-see, e.g., Angela Hart, From Birth Control to the Border Wall: 17
Ways California Sued the Trump Administration in 2017, SAc. BEE, Dec. 11, 2017, http://www.
sacbee.com/news/politics-govemment/capitol-alert/articlel88901094.html; Jack Crowe, New York
Attorney General Has Filed 100 Acts of Resistance Against Trump, DAILY SIGNAL, Dec. 27, 2017,
http://dailysignal.com/2017/12/27/new-york-attorney-general-has-filed-100-acts-of-resistance-
against-trump/ (documenting lawsuits and acts of resistance in the two largest blue states, California
and New York)-I make no empirical claim about volume here. My emphasis is on the cutting-
edge issues raised in many of the most high-profile federalism battlegrounds.
2. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (striking down federal gun control
law provision); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (same); United States v. Morrison, 527
U.S. 1068 (1999) (striking down federal law provision punishing domestic violence); New York v.
United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (striking down portions of federal law dealing with nuclear
waste disposal); Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 2 (2013) (striking down portions of federal
voting rights law).
3. E.g., Hawaii v. Trump, No. 17-17168, 2017 WL 5343014 (9th Cir. Dec. 22, 2017) (per
curiam).
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sanctuary jurisdictions, the erection of a border wall,5 stringent enforcement
of the federal Controlled Substances Act's ban on marijuana,6 and the refusal
of President Trump to release his tax returns.7 In many respects, it is healthy
and heartening to see federalism principles invoked by the left end of the
political spectrum. Like First Amendment protections for freedom of
expression, federalism doctrines are defensible in the long run only if they
are applied the same way without regard to the viewpoints of the actors
invoking them.
The seeming agreement on the Left that federalism's guarantees of
meaningful state and local sovereignty are important tools in an era when the
opposition party controls all three federal branches does not mean, of course,
that modern proponents of broad subnational autonomy agree in all the
particulars of what constitutional federalism means. Certainly the lower
federal court judges who have ruled in some of the prominent disputes so far
have differed significantly in the ways they have analyzed and applied the
key federalism doctrines.
In this Essay, I hope to sketch out a few-but by no means all-of the
more high-profile federalism flashpoints that have emerged over the past year
or so and offer preliminary assessments of some of the decisions that lower
courts (and legislative bodies) have been rendering. As we will see, there are
areas of agreement and areas of divergence. Even as to some areas of
agreement, there are plausible arguments to be made that the Supreme Court
will (and in some cases perhaps should) see things differently as these disputes
make their way up the appellate ladder in the coming months and years.
Sanctuary Skirmishes
Let us start with the clashes over so-called sanctuary jurisdictions. In
particular, two noteworthy cases filed by cities and counties located in
different parts of the country invoke similar and illuminating arguments
challenging the Administration's efforts to curtail jurisdictions refusing
4. E.g., County of Santa Clara v. Trump, No. 17-CV-00574-WHO, 2017 WL 5569835 (N.D.
Cal. Nov. 20, 2017); City and County of San Francisco v. Trump, No. 17-CV-00485-WHO, 2017
WL 5569835 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2017); City of Chicago v. Sessions, No. 17-CV-5720, 2017 WL
3386388 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 16, 2017).
5. See, e.g., Alissa Greenberg, Berkeley, Calif to Avoid Business with Companies Involved in
Building Trump's Wall, WASH. POST, Mar. 17,2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news /morning-
mix/wp/2017/03/17/berkeley-calif-to-boycott-companies-involved-in-building-trumps-wall.
6. See, e.g., Patrick McGreevy, California Officials and the Marijuana Industry Prepare to
Fight a Federal Crackdown, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2017, http://www.latimes.com/politics/la-la-pol-
ca-federal-pot-crackdown-response-20170225-story.html.
7. See, e.g., Chris Morris, Donald Trump May Be Forced to Disclose Tax Returns,
FORTUNE, Sept. 15, 2017, http://fortune.com/2017/09/15/trump-tax-returns-2020-election.
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assistance-including informational assistance-to federal immigration
enforcement efforts.8 Although the term "sanctuary" lacks universal legal
meaning, a number of cities, counties, and states consider themselves
sanctuaries, insofar as they have consciously chosen to limit their
cooperation with federal immigration authorities. In many instances, their
justification is the view that residents are safer and healthier if undocumented
residents feel free to report crimes to local police and to avail themselves of
other public resources (e.g., health clinics and schools) without fear that local
authorities are actively working with the feds in deportation efforts.9
As far as I am aware, the first sanctuary city lawsuit brought by locals
against the federal government was filed in the spring of 2017 by the City
and County of San Francisco.10 (San Francisco's complaint was later
consolidated with the County of Santa Clara's somewhat similar
complaint.)" Shortly before Thanksgiving, U.S. District Judge William
Orrick (Northern District of California, San Francisco) issued a permanent
nationwide injunction blocking enforcement of a challenged portion of the
federal Executive Order at issue. 12
The second litigation, filed several months later in the summer of 2017
by the City of Chicago, sought to block conditions that the federal
government said it would be imposing on applicants for certain federal
funding.13 One of those proposed conditions mirrored key provisions of the
Executive Order that was challenged in the Bay Area litigation. U.S. District
Court Judge Harry Leinenweber in the Northern District of Illinois (Chicago)
granted partial permanent ationwide injunctive relief, also shortly before
Thanksgiving, to the City of Chicago, but, importantly, Judge Leinenweber
rejected the particular claims that had been successfully argued in the case
before Judge Orrick.14
8. The litigations are: City of Chicago v. Sessions, No. 17-CV-5720, 2017 WL 3386388
(N.D. Ill. Nov. 16, 2017); City and County of San Francisco v. Trump, No. 17-cv-00485-WHO,
2017 WL 5569835 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2017); County of Santa Clara v. Trump, No. 17-cv-00574-
WHO, 2017 WL 5569835 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2017). In this Essay, I do not address all aspects of
these cases, but only some of the key ones.
9. See, e.g., Complaint at 14, County of Santa Clara v. Trump, No. 17-CV-00574-WHO,
2017 WL 5569835 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2017).
10. City and County of San Francisco, No. 17-CV-00485-WHO, 2017 WL 5569835 (N.D.
Cal. Nov. 20, 2017).
11. County of Santa Clara, No. 17-CV-00574-WHO, 2017 WL 5569835 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 20,
2017).
12. Id.
13. City of Chicago, No. 17-CV-5720, 2017 WL 3386388 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 16, 2017).
14. Memorandum Opinion and Order at 25-35, City of Chicago, No. 17 C 5720, 2017 WL
5499167 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 15, 2017); Memorandum Opinion and Order at 7-10 City of Chicago, No.
17 C 5720, 2017 WL 5499167 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 16, 2017).
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Although both lawsuits thus resulted in at least partial (and nationwide)
injunctive victories for the plaintiff localities, the grounds for victory in the
two litigations diverged, and the analyses of key Supreme Court cases on the
merits of a central federalism doctrine-the so-called anti-commandeering
principle-were quite different. To see the similarities and differences in the
two district judges' approaches, we need to delve into the specifics.
Each of these disputes between municipalities and the Trump
Administration relate to federal attempts to pressure so-called sanctuary
jurisdictions into providing more enforcement assistance to federal
immigration authorities. The Trump Administration believes (and Candidate
Trump repeatedly argued)15 that jurisdictions that hold themselves out as
sanctuaries-who promise not to provide assistance to the Immigration and
Customs Enforcement ("ICE") agency-facilitate federal, state, and local
crime. (The trial-and acquittal-last fall of Jose Ines Garcia Zarate, an
undocumented man accused of murdering San Francisco woman and
American citizen Kate Steinle two years ago, directed a lot of publicity to
the Administration's stance.)16  Based on his views, shortly after taking
office President Trump issued Executive Order 13768 (the "Executive
Order" or "Order"),17  which directs relevant cabinet officers to deprive
"sanctuary jurisdictions" of federal funding and to "take [additional]
appropriate enforcement action" against hem.18
Importantly, this Order, by its written terms at least, defines "sanctuary
jurisdictions" somewhat narrowly, implying that sanctuary jurisdictions are
those "that willfully refuse to comply with 8 U.S.C. 1373."19 Section 1373,
in turn, says in pertinent part that "a Federal, State, or local government
entity or official may not prohibit, or in any way restrict, any government
15. See, e.g., Christopher Ingraham, Trump Says Sanctuary Cities Are Hotbeds of Crime.
Data Say the Opposite. CHICAGO TRIB., Jan. 27, 2017, http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/
nationworld/ct-trump-sanctuary-city-crime-data-20170127-story.html.
16. Sophie Tatum, Trump Says Steinle Verdict a "Travesty of Justice", CNN, Dec. 1, 2017,
http://www.cnn.com/2017/11/30/politics/kate-steinle-verdict-reactions/index.html.
17. Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior of the United States, Exec. Order No. 13768, 82
Fed. Reg. 8799 (Jan. 30, 2017).
18. See id. at § 9(a): "In furtherance of this policy, the Attorney General and the Secretary,
in their discretion and to the extent consistent with law, shall ensure that jurisdictions that willfully
refuse to comply with 8 U.S.C. 1373 (sanctuary jurisdictions) are not eligible to receive Federal
grants, except as deemed necessary for law enforcement purposes by the Attorney General or the
Secretary. The Secretary has the authority to designate, in his discretion and to the extent consistent
with law, a jurisdiction as a sanctuary jurisdiction. The Attorney General shall take appropriate
enforcement action against any entity that violates 8 U.S.C. 1373, or which has in effect a statute,
policy, or practice that prevents or hinders the enforcement of Federal law."
19. Although the Order does not include "sanctuary" in any definitions section, § 9 reads:
"Sanctuary Jurisdictions. It is the policy of the executive branch to ensure, to the fullest extent of
the law, that a State, or apolitical subdivision of a State, shall comply with 8 U.S.C. 1373."
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entity or official from [maintaining,] sending to, or receiving from, [federal
immigration authorities] information regarding the citizenship or
immigration status, lawful or unlawful, of any individual." 20  Thus, the
statute seeks to prevent a state or local government from having a policy or
practice that forbids maintaining or giving to the feds information on the
immigration status of individuals.2 1
The Executive Order instructs cabinet officials to take enforcement
action against sanctuary jurisdictions, which could include the discretionary
termination of federal funding to them. In the case of San Francisco, the City
receives over a billion dollars a year in federal funds, which it says represents
about thirteen percent of its budget.22 Fear of losing this money is ostensibly
what led San Francisco authorities to challenge the Executive Order and also
the underlying statute, section 1373, even as the City maintained that it was
not violating-and had no plans to violate-section 1373.23
Notwithstanding some jurisdictional wrinkles raised by San Francisco's
assertion that it was complying with section 1373, the plaintiffs in the
California litigation sought a declaration against section 1373's validity and
an injunction against its enforcement.24
Section 1373 is also one of the main points of contention in Chicago's
lawsuit, which is somewhat narrower insofar as it focuses not on the
Executive Order altogether, but rather one way in which the Administration
has followed up on the Order in the funding arena. As noted earlier, the
Executive Order directs relevant cabinet officers to consider depriving
"sanctuary jurisdictions" of federal funding, and pursuant to that provision
United States Attorney General Jeffrey Sessions has been trying to deny
funding to sanctuary jurisdictions who seek Department of Justice ("DOJ")
grants under one program in which the City of Chicago claims a particular
20. 8 U.S.C. § 1373 (1996).
21. In the California litigation, the plaintiffs allege that the federal government also considers
any jurisdiction that does not honor detention-or detainer-requests from federal officials also to
be a sanctuary jurisdiction. This assertion is not supported by the text of the Executive Order, and
although it was relied upon by the district judge in ruling against the federal government, I do not
evaluate this reading of the Order in my analysis below.
22. Complaint at 16, City and County of San Francisco v. Trump, No. 17-CV-00485-WHO,
2017 WL 5569835 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 31, 2017).
23. Id. at 10. Santa Clara County, by contrast, did acknowledge that its policies and
ordinances do instruct county officials not to provide immigration information to the feds, which
would seem to violate the plain terms of § 1373. Complaint at 13-14, County of Santa Clara v.
Trump, No. 17-CV-00574-WHO, 2017 WL 5569835 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 31, 2017).
24. Complaint at 20, City and County of San Francisco, No. 17-CV-00485-WHO, 2017 WL
5569835 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 31, 2017).
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interest, the Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant Program.25
Byrne Assistance grants support state and local law enforcement with money
for equipment, training, and personnel.26 In late summer, General Sessions
announced that the DOJ would be requiring all funding applicants to: (1)
provide federal agents with advanced notice of the scheduled release from
state custody of certain individuals suspected of immigration violations; (2)
provide these agents access to non-citizens who are being housed in state and
local detention facilities; and (3) certify compliance with 8 U.S.C. § 1373.27
The first two conditions (the so-called "notice" condition and the
"physical access" condition),2 8 were not implicated in the San
Francisco/Santa Clara lawsuit, but the common denominator between the
two litigations in the West and Midwest was the validity of section 1373. It
is on that question (and also the question of nationwide relief) that I want to
plumb the district courts' analyses.
In both lawsuits, a prominent argument made by the local plaintiffs was
that section 1373 and the duties it imposes fall outside the federal
government's powers as those powers are properly understood under the
Tenth Amendment.
The federal government argues that it has authority to enact and insist
on compliance with section 1373 pursuant to, among other things, its power
under Article I of the Constitution to regulate immigration, naturalization,
and foreign affairs.29 As a general matter, this power is quite broad and may
very well suffice to support a variety of federal dictates in the immigration
realm. But states and cities have a rejoinder here-a series of cases the
Supreme Court decided in the 1990s that, collectively, create a rule known
as the "anti-commandeering" doctrine.30 The basic idea is that,
notwithstanding broad Article I powers of the federal government, the Tenth
25. Complaint at 1-5, City of Chicago v. Sessions, No. 17-CV-5720, 2017 WL 3386388
(N.D. Ill. Aug. 7, 2017).
26. Id.
27. Id. at 3.
28. These first two conditions were the ones on which the judge ruled in Chicago's favor and
granted injunctive relief, largely on the ground that Congress did not authorize these conditions.
The analysis was one of statutory interpretation and separation of powers. By contrast, the analysis
of 1373 in both lawsuits was undertaken on federalism terms, and the federalism doctrine's
meaning in this context is what I seek to explore in this Essay.
29. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 ("Congress shall have power ... [t]o establish an
uniform rule of naturalization"); art. I, § 8, cl. 3 ("Congress shall have power to ... [t]o regulate
commerce with foreign nations . . .").
30. For general discussion, see Vikram David Amar, Response: The Case for Reforming
Presidential Elections by Sub-Constitutional Means: The Electoral College, the National Popular
Vote Compact, and Congressional Power, 100 GEO. L.J. 237, 258-59 (2011) [hereafter The Case
for Reforming Presidential Elections].
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Amendment forbids the federal government from coercing states and
localities into providing affirmative enforcement assistance to federal
authorities. In this setting, states and cities argue that the anti-
commandeering principle prevents the feds from requiring state and local
authorities to affirmatively provide information about or access to
individuals who may have committed immigration law violations. They thus
argue that section 1373's requirement hat they provide to federal authorities
"information regarding the citizenship or immigration status, lawful or
unlawful, of any individual" constitutes impermissible "commandeering."
(In the California litigation, the plaintiffs also argue that the federal
government seems to be applying section 1373 so as to require local
jurisdictions to honor requests for detention-so-called detainer requests-
as well, a reading of the statute that goes beyond its terms and that I do not
address in this Essay.)
In pressing this anti-commandeering argument, the cities rely primarily
on principles of federalism expounded in the seminal case of Printz v. United
States,3 1 a 1997 Supreme Court decision holding that the federal government
could not require state and local law enforcement officers to conduct
background checks on gun purchasers as part of the implementation of a
federal law (the Brady gun control law). 32 "The Federal Government," the
Court said grandly in Printz, "may neither issue directives requiring the
States to address particular problems, nor command the States' officers, or
those of their political subdivisions, to administer or enforce a federal
regulatory program. "33 According to the sanctuary municipalities, this is
precisely what section 1373 does.
It is possible that Printz does not command majority support on the
Court today. It was a controversial 5-4 ruling subject to much academic
criticism when it issued,34 and three of the five justices in its majority have
left the Court.35 Perhaps their three replacementS36 fully agree with Printz,
but there has not been a significant case in this area in the last two decades
that gives us much clear indication. Moreover, the fact that Printz involved
gun control (at a time when many judges and scholars were beginning to
think that the Second Amendment ought to be read more forcefully)
31. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
32. Id. at 935. Printz itself built on New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
33. Printz, 521 U.S. at 935.
34. See Evan H. Caminker, Printz, State Sovereignty, and the Limits ofFormalism, 1997 SUP.
CT. REV. 199 (1997).
35. Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices O'Connor and Scalia were in the Printz majority.
36. These three Justices were replaced, respectively, by Chief Justice Roberts, and Justices
Alito and Gorsuch.
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complicates matters; it is possible that some people who believe Printz was
correctly decided might not apply it in the same way to other subject matter
areas. In this vein, some Justices might be inclined to create an exception to
the Printz principle for immigration or national security matters. On the
other hand, perhaps the two remaining dissenters in Printz (Justices Ginsburg
and Breyer) have now come to see its wisdom, or at least consider it binding
precedent that ought, for the sake of stare decisis, to apply in this setting.
Although these factors make predictions of the Supreme Court's current
stance somewhat harder, they (rightly) did not factor into the analyses of the
district courts regarding section 1373. I say "rightly" because the Court has
made clear that when one of its earlier rulings is, by its language and logic,
on point in a dispute, but recent developments indicate the possibility that
the Court may move in a new direction, lower courts are supposed to apply
the prior ruling on point, and leave it to the Justices to consider whether they
want to overrule or limit the prior ruling;37 lower courts are not allowed to
"underrule," if you will.
But even if Printz remains good law for the foreseeable future, the case
itself is a complicated ruling whose application to the sanctuary setting is
open to some argumentation. For example, in Printz the Court expressly
reserved whether its holding should extend to federal laws "which require
only the provision of information to the Federal Government."3 8 To the
extent that section 1373 is limited to information exchanges,39 one could
argue that 1373 does not violate Printz' core teachings. Also, pulling the
doctrinal lens back a bit, note that section 1373 (unlike the law in Printz)
imposes limitations not just upon state and local entities and officials, but on
federal entities and officials as well. In that sense, it is not a law that targets
state and local government for distinctive burdens, the way the laws in Printz
and the major case on which Printz built, New York v. United States,40 did.
In a related vein, supporters of the federal government in the sanctuary
city lawsuits might try to argue that the key factor relied upon in Printz
(which was also the key factor in New York v. United States)-the way in
which federal commandeering might make it hard for citizens of a state to
hold the federal government accountable for unpopular policy 41 -is not
present in the sanctuary jurisdiction setting. In Printz, the Court apparently
37. See Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
38. Printz, 521 U.S. at 917-18.
39. I note again, but do not analyze, that the plaintiffs and the court in the Bay Area case read
section 1373 beyond its text to include not just information but also detainer requests.
40. The law in Printz singled out Chief Law Enforcement Officers who were defined as
state/local employees, and the law in New York regulated states qua states.
41. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1992); Printz, 521 U.S. at 920.
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worried that this concern would be implicated insofar as disappointed
would-be gun purchasers might blame local sheriffs who, under the federal
Brady Law, were the ones required to conduct background checks and notify
people who failed that they could not buy a gun. By contrast, the argument
would run, when the federal government merely commands that states and
cities maintain and turn over information to federal immigration officials, it
is the feds (and only the feds) who take action on that information in a way
visible to the public. Indeed, no affected immigrants (or persons sympathetic
to them) would ever necessarily know what, if any, information the feds
received from local officials.
I find this line of argument unpersuasive. Recall that sanctuary city
proponents often explain their decisions to become sanctuaries on the ground
that residents are safer and healthier if undocumented residents feel free to
report crimes to police and to avail themselves of other public resources (e.g.,
health clinics and schools) without fear that local authorities are actively
working in concert with the feds in deportation efforts. If local officials are
not able to publicly and credibly proclaim and publicize that they will not
provide information (or other support) to the feds, undocumented persons
may clam up or fail to seek health and education services (whether or not the
undocumented persons know the details of any support the locals provide),
and the resulting possible increases in unsolved crime and public health
problems may be blamed by the body politic on local officials (because they
are generally the most visible level of government as to these matters) rather
than the federal architects of section 1373. Or, at least, this corruption of
accountability is similarly as plausible as it was in New York and Printz.42
There is another defense of section 1373-which was effectively
accepted by the district court in Chicago-that bears discussion. This
defense was developed in a case from the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit hat was decided shortly after Printz, in which the Second
Circuit judges rejected a Printz-based attack (similar to those made by the
California and Chicago municipalities) to section 1373.43 In upholding
section 1373 against the Printz-inspired attack in 1999, the Second Circuit
reasoned that although the federal government may not compel states and
localities to carry out federal programs, it may prohibit them from restricting
42. I have never found the accountability argument in these cases to be very convincing,
because both New York and Printz presuppose an idiosyncratic body politic-one sophisticated
enough to know which level of government is nominally responsible for an unpopular policy, but
sophisticated enough to know when federal pressure or coercion may in fact be responsible for
state/local actions. Indeed, does anyone think that federal threats of preemption or reduced funding
(which were held in these cases not to be commandeering) are any different than outright federal
commands with regard to making accountability to voters more difficult?
43. City of New York v. United States, 179 F.3d 29 (2d Cir. 1999).
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state and local officials from "voluntarily" exchanging information with
federal authorities.44 Otherwise, the Second Circuit reasoned, states and
localities could hold federal authorities hostage, and frustrate federal
programs by thwarting "voluntary" cooperation.45
The Second Circuit's logic here is deeply flawed. The Second Circuit
believes that state and municipal officials ought not to be constrained by state
law from "voluntarily" cooperating with the feds. But state and municipal
officials in this setting are not operating as private citizens who voluntarily
get to decide how to spend their time and resources. Instead, they are
operating as state government actors, whose discretion to voluntarily act
while on the job is heavily circumscribed by state and local laws. The
"voluntary" decision whether to devote state and local resources to federal
enforcement is (or ought to be) located at the level of state or local
government, not at the level of the individual state or local employees. State
resources-including the time and information of state employees-are
owned by the state, and not by individual employees. Thus, I find it hard to
know what "voluntary" means in this setting (something neither the Second
Circuit nor the Chicago district court that embraced its reasoning explained.)
To see the flaws in the Second Circuit's reliance on the belief in an
inherent authority of local officials to "voluntarily" decide to cooperate with
federal officials (despite any state law that seeks to prohibit such
cooperation), let us imagine a variant on the facts of the Printz case. Printz
itself involved a provision in the Brady Handgun Violence Protection Act
that required local law enforcement officials to conduct background checks
on people seeking to buy firearms during an interim period when the federal
government was in the process of setting up its own background-checking
system. This was the provision the Court struck down as impermissibly
interfering with local enforcement decisions and impermissibly
compromising political accountability. But suppose that he Brady Act
provision had instead said something such as:
No state or local government can adopt any law or policy that prevents
any local law enforcement official from using public resources-
including employee time and equipment-to conduct background
checks to assist the federal government's gun control efforts, if the local
official voluntarily chooses to expend state and local resources for this
purpose, even if such assistance to the federal government diverts
enforcement resources from other areas prioritized by state law.
44. City of New York, 179 F.3d at 37.
45. Id.
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Could anyone believe that such a law would have been allowed by the
Printz majority? I think not. And yet such an implausible premise is
precisely what undergirds the Second Circuit's reasoning.
Let us turn now in more detail to how the two district court judges in
San Francisco and Chicago resolved the competing arguments concerning
the applicability of Printz and the non-commandeering principle to section
1373. As noted above,46 Judge Leinenweber in the Chicago district court
accepted the Second Circuit's reasoning and upheld section 1373 (even as
he granted relief to Chicago on the other two nonsection- 1373 conditions on
funding imposed by Attorney General Sessions).47 By contrast, the San
Francisco district judge, Judge Orrick, found section 1373 violative of the
anti-commandeering principle.48 Judge Orrick's opinion-which covered a
lot of territory quickly and did not always connect the analytic dots-relied
in part on his understanding of section 1373 as going beyond information-
gathering and also applying to decisions by local officials not to honor
federal requests for detaining individuals.49 This broad reading of section
1373, whether justified or not, does not seem to address the Second Circuit's
reasoning; if a local official has the power to voluntarily provide information
(as the Second Circuit believed), then the official presumably has the power
to voluntarily assist in detention. To be clear, Judge Orrick never mentioned
or addressed the Second Circuit case, but he (unlike Judge Leinenweber)
implicitly rejected the key (albeit flawed) line invoked by the Second Circuit,
between "voluntary" and "involuntary" actions by local officials confronted
by conflicting state and federal mandates.
If one concludes that section 1373 as written constitutes
commandeering in violation of federalism principles laid out in Printz, then
the statute itself is not a permissible exercise of the federal government's
Article I power to regulate immigration. In that event, unless, as explained
in the next few paragraphs, another basis can be found for federal authority
for insisting on compliance with section 1373's requirements, the statute and
the Executive Order that requires its enforcement are very vulnerable.
If one decides that section 1373 does run afoul of Printz, the only basis
for the Executive Order's insistence that cities comply with 1373's substance
would be federal power under the so-called Spending Clause, under which
46. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
47. Memorandum Opinion and Order at 25-35, City of Chicago v. Sessions, No. 17-CV-
5720, 2017 WL 3386388 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 15, 2017); Memorandum Opinion and Order at 7-10, City
of Chicago, No. 17-CV-5720, 2017 WL 3386388 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 16, 2017).
48. Order Granting Motion for Summary Judgment at 22-24, County of Santa Clara v.
Trump, No. 17-CV-00574-WHO, 2017 WL 5569835 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2017).
49. Id.
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the federal government may sometimes achieve what it cannot directly
command by creating monetary incentives for state and local governments.
The Executive Order instructs federal officials to withhold significant federal
funds from sanctuary jurisdictions-including federal funds that have
nothing to do with immigration. This would be a calamity for San Francisco,
which allegedly receives more than one billion dollars annually, for a wide
variety of programs, from the federal government.0
Fortunately for San Francisco, when the Supreme Court held in 2012
that states could opt out of the Affordable Care Act's Medicaid expansion in
National Federation of Independent Businesses v. Sebelius,1 it laid down
strict prerequisites for the withdrawal of existing federal funding of states
and localities. First, the federal government must give clear notice of the
conditions on the funding up front, so states and localities can choose
whether they want the money enough to accept whatever strings are
attached.52 Second, there must be a logical nexus between the federal
funding in question and the strings attached, so that the federal government
cannot coerce states and localities by ratcheting up the stakes by bringing in
other monieS.53 And third, even if there is a nexus between the funds and the
condition imposed, the funds cannot involve significant monies the state or
locality has been relying on for so long such that there is really no choice but
to accede to a new condition going forward.54
Application of the National Federation of Independent Businesses
("NFIB") test would likely invalidate the Executive Order in the San
Francisco litigation, which is precisely what Judge Orrick ruled.5 Even
assuming that the Order fully reflects the will of Congress (a separate
important question I do not address here), with respect to most if not all of
the federal funding at issue, there was no clear notice to the City-at the time
the funds were offered and accepted-that he funds might be contingent on
compliance with section 1373. And even if that problem might be solved by
reading 1373 and the Executive Order requiring compliance with it as
prospective only-cutting off only future funding on account of future
violations of section 1373-the key vulnerability of the Order lies in the lack
of a nexus between the funding called into question by the Order, which goes
50. Complaint at 16, City and County of San Francisco v. Trump, No. 4:17-CV-00485-DMR,
2017 WL 412999 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 31, 2017).
51. Nat'lFed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012).
52. Id. at 678-79.
53. Id. at 676-77.
54. Id. at 581-82.
55. Order Granting Motion for Summary Judgment at 22-24, County of Santa Clara v.
Trump, 250 F. Supp. 3d 497 (N.D. Cal. 2017).
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towards a wide variety of programs, and section 1373. Finally, and relatedly,
the large size of the funding at issue-according to the city, some thirteen
percent of its budget-tends to make the Executive Order's threat look
coercive, at least under the lens of NFIB. (It is interesting to note that the
federal Medicaid funding at issue in NFIB amounted to about the same
percentage of state budgets as the percentage involved here.)56 Thus, the
Executive Order, which threatens across-the-board funding cuts based on an
immigration-specific condition, would seem to violate the rule laid down in
NFIB and the cases on which it built.
Analysis of the Chicago case is somewhat different, because the funding
conditions at issue there were specifically limited to the Byrne grants, which
are focused on law enforcement, an area that has a relatively more clear nexus
to section 1373. That is why Judge Leinenweber upheld section 1373 under
the Spending Clause even as he also (wrongly to my mind) followed the
Second Circuit's reasoning with regard to the application of Printz.5
I should add that Judge Leinenweber's opinion (in addition to being
seduced by the Second Circuit's specious reasoning) did not seem to reflect
an understanding of how various pieces of federalism doctrine fit together.
In addressing Attorney General Sessions' insistence that Chicago comply
with section 1373, Judge Leinenweber conceived of the inquiry into section
1373's constitutionality as follows:
[The AG's insistence on] compliance [with section 1373] must be
proper under the Spending Clause, and 1373 must pass constitutional
muster [under the Printz analysis.] As the City has not argued that the
compliance condition violates the Spending Clause, the Court now
58turns to the Section 1373 question [under the Printz line of cases].
As noted earlier, the judge concluded that section 1373 was valid under
the Spending Clause, so running the statute through the Printz analysis did
not in the end affect the judge's bottom line. But putting aside whether the
court's rejection of the City's Printz argument was convincing, my point here
is that once it is conceded (as the judge says it was) that compliance with
section 1373 to obtain federal money is a valid condition on funding under
the Spending Clause doctrine, it is irrelevant whether 1373's mandate-in
the absence of a conditional funding scheme-would violate the Printz anti-
commandeering rule. Passing muster under Spending Clause doctrine and
56. See Nat' Fed'n of Indep. Bus., 567 U.S. at 581-82.
57. Memorandum Opinion and Order at 10-25, City of Chicago v. Sessions, 264 F. Supp. 3d
933 (N.D. Ill. 2017).
58. Id.
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passing muster under the Printz doctrine are alternative ways for the federal
government to prevail in establishing it had proper authority under Article I
of the Constitution. If it wins on either the immigration power (by
successfully arguing that Printz poses no problem) or the spending power, it
wins. It need not win on both, the way the district court erroneously thought.
Put another way, if a federal condition on funding is permissible under the
Spending Clause doctrine, it cannot, by definition, be an impermissible
commandeering, since (by hypothesis) states have an option of turning the
deal down. Hence, there is no federal mandate that could be considered to
be commandeering.
This point may seem nit-picky, but it is not. It goes to the fundamental
ways in which distinct yet related doctrines (in this case the Spending Clause
doctrine and the anti-commandeering principle) involving federal-state
relations fit together. If federal courts are going to be able to enforce the
limits that federalism creates on the national government, while at the same
time permit the feds to operate in their own proper sphere, judges (and their
law clerks) need to understand not just nuanced technical details of various
specific doctrines, but the overall federalism big picture as well.
In this spirit of trying to lay out and understand the pieces of the big
federalism landscape, let us assume for a moment that-because the Second
Circuit is right or because section 1373 does not impair accountability
because it involves only information or because it imposes only de minimis
burdens on states and localities-section 1373 is understood not to violate
the anti-commandeering principle. What follows from that? If courts were
to conclude that section 1373 is permissible under Printz, the Executive
Order at issue in the San Francisco case-notwithstanding the breadth of its
funding prohibitions-perhaps could be upheld. After all, if the federal
government could go to court to enjoin the city from violating section 1373
(and presumably it could get an injunction if section 1373's commands are
valid), and to obtain contempt sanctions if the city disobeys a court order,
why should it not also be able to condition federal funding on the city's
compliance? In NFIB, the federal government clearly could not have forced
states to accept the Medicaid expansion; its only way to affect their behavior
was to use the power of the Treasury. But where a state or locality actually
violates a valid and enforceable federal law, it is less clear there is anything
wrong with the federal government enforcing that law fiscally rather than
through the courts. Some might wonder whether cities should have the
option of continued defiance without having to face disastrous financial
consequences (civic, rather than civil, disobedience, if you will). It is hard
to know why they should; valid federal commands ought to be enforced. (If
you doubt this is true with respect to sanctuary cities, ask yourself how you
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feel about Alabama courts refusing to confer gay marriages; would you be
bothered by a threat to withhold federal funding there?)
Another way of putting the point is that all of the three elements of the
Spending Clause doctrine in NFIB discussed above are consciously designed
to preserve some meaningful choice by states and localities about whether or
not to accept conditional federal funds. But states have no legitimate choice
whether to comply with valid federal commands, so arguably none of the
Spending Clause protections ought to apply.59
But does all of this mean that the federal government could announce,
without notice, that a state or locality was being stripped of all federal
funding just because it was violating (or had violated in the past) any of the
innumerable federal laws on the books that bind it? My instinct is that even
where the government has the power of direct fiscal enforcement, some
measure of notice should be required before it can strip a state or locality of
what may be long-established, essential federal funding. Certainly, the
government has to give individuals some notice of what the consequence of
violations of law will be, largely because it owes individuals due process.
Does federalism require the federal government to give states the same
notice, even when states have the legal obligation to comply with the federal
command (just so states can lobby federal legislators or properly adjust
resources to minimize the likelihood of noncompliance) ?60
Moreover, even if notice is provided, can the federal funding weapon
really be completely unrelated to the state or local violation and be gigantic
in size simply because the feds could enforce the law in court? Might there
be some analogy to the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment61
(which protects persons) that limits the federal government's ability to
intimidate states into steering far clear of noncompliance?
Remedial Scope
Putting aside the complicated merits questions in many of the
federalism cases in the last year, a common procedural/remedial question is
59. I note as an aside that one reason the feds might prefer using funding leverage rather than
seeking injunctive relief is that cities may pay more attention to the potential for loss of funds than
to the specter of contempt, which may or may not cost as much depending on what sanction the
judge imposes.
60. Both the San Francisco and Chicago district courts insisted that federal conditions be
clear and non-vague, but such requirements follow from the contractual nature of the spending
clause doctrine. The question I explore at this point is somewhat different-when states have no
choice to make and are obligated by law to comply, are they still entitled to clarity as to the
consequences of noncompliance?
61. U.S. Const. amend. VIII ("Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.").
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how broadly the relief a lower court might issue to the plaintiffs-blocking
executive action-can extend. With increasing frequency, but often without
extensive analysis, district courts have been issuing so-called "nationwide"
or global relief, preventing various federal defendants from enforcing
policies not only against the named plaintiffs in the case at hand, but also
against anyone else. One example is the various "nationwide" blocks on
various of President Trump's executive orders relating to entry into the
county issued by district court judges in Hawaii and elsewhere.62 Other
examples are the two rulings discussed above in the sanctuary city setting;
both Judge Orrick and Judge Leinenweber blocked proposed federal
conditions on funding not just as applied to the plaintiff cities in court, but
as applied to any other state or local funding applicant as well.63
Put simply, in these and other cases, lower federal courts are issuing
orders that offer protection not just to the plaintiffs who brought the cases at
hand, but o all similar parties, including parties located in areas where other
federal courts might have different views on the permissibility of the federal
policies in question.
The general appropriateness of these sweeping, nationwide (or, in some
instances, global) orders is something the Supreme Court needs to take up
explicitly, beyond the merits of any particular dispute. To be sure, when a
federal district court has jurisdiction (that is, the power to speak the law) over
a particular dispute and over the defendants (including U.S. government
agencies) who are being sued, the court has authority to order the defendants
to act or not act. This includes the authority to issue a directive that often
has effects outside the territorial jurisdiction of the court, if for no other
reason than because sometimes a plaintiff operates in more than one federal
judicial district, and a court needs to be able to give a plaintiff full relief-
not just local relief-from a defendant's wrongful actions.
Moreover, there is general agreement that a court is not forbidden, even
outside of a class action setting, from ordering relief that in effect goes
beyond the named plaintiffs to also protect other would-be plaintiffs, if full
relief cannot be given to the named plaintifs without also necessarily
regulating the defendants' interactions with other persons. For example, a
court would be justified in ordering the police to stop enforcing a motorcycle
helmet law overaggressively as to all riders-and not just as to the named
62. E.g., Hawaii v. Trump, No. 17-17168, 2017 WL 5343014 (9th Cir. Dec. 22, 2017) (per
curiam).
63. See Memorandum Opinion and Order at 28, City and County of San Francisco v. Trump
No. 17-CV-00574-WHO, 2017 WL 5569835 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 2017); Memorandum Opinion
and Order at 41, City of Chicago v. Sessions, No. 17-CV-5720, 2017 WL 3386388 (N.D. Ill Sept.
15, 2017).
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plaintiffs-because highway patrol officers would have no way of
distinguishing plaintiffs from non-plaintiffs before pulling someone over.
Another example: If a school is ordered to desegregate its student body, then
all students-and not just the named plaintiffs-will obtain the benefits of
attending a desegregated institution.
But in most of the settings these days in which district judges are giving
nationwide or global relief, full relief could be given to named plaintiffs
without ordering the defendants to refrain from enforcing contested policies
against anyone lse (let alone against everybody else). And it is one thing to
make sure that a plaintiff who sues gets full relief; it is another for the relief
to extend beyond the parties in the case at hand for no reason having to do
with the actual plaintiffs.
What could be wrong about protecting other persons who themselves
did not sue? After all, if the federal government is acting illegally, shouldn't
a court should tell it to stop violating the law against everyone in America
(or the world), not just the parties who happened to sue? This seemingly
plausible instinct fails to account for the very important fact that not all
judges will necessarily agree on whether the federal government is in the
wrong. And there are problems when one district judge attempts (in the
absence of a certified class action, where there are complex procedures in
place to make sure that all absent parties are properly represented and that
the federal government is on clear notice when it chooses how aggressively
to contest a case) to decide an issue for the whole country.
One difficulty with district courts making grand, sweeping legal rulings
like this is that such a role doesn't align with their institutional
strengths. District court judges have much less time and fewer resources
than appellate courts, and the primary functions of district court judges are
to manage litigation, evaluate evidence and make factual determinations
(sometimes very important factual determinations), apply settled law, and
also take an intelligent stab at novel legal matters so as to carefully frame or
"tee up" those questions for the Court of Appeals and (in some cases) the
Supreme Court. Indeed, resolving matters once and for all for the whole
nation is a power we invest principally in the Supreme Court, and not any
lower courts.
It is for that reason that conventional doctrine often says something like:
"injunctive relief should be no more burdensome to the defendant than
necessary to provide complete relief to the [actual] plaintiffs."64 Related to
this is the traditional admonition that when exercising its equitable powers
to issue an injunction, a court must be "mindful of any effect its decision
64. Califano v. Yamaski, 442 U.S. 682, 702 (1979).
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might have outside its jurisdiction [insofar as c]ourts ordinarily should not
award injunctive relief that would cause substantial interference with another
court's sovereignty."65 A leading casebook puts hings this way: "a [federal
district] court can enjoin [a] defendant only with respect to the defendant's
treatment of plaintiffs actually before the court, either individually or as part
of a certified class."66
A contrary approach would, in the words of one Supreme Court case
describing a similar concept-non-mutual collateral estoppel against the
federal government-"substantially thwart the development of important
questions of law by freezing the first final decision rendered on a particular
legal issue."67 If and when the issue makes its way to the Supreme Court,
overly broad district court (or circuit court) injunctions that prevent other
courts from hearing cases and weighing in could "deprive [the] Court of the
benefit it receives from permitting several courts of appeals to explore a
difficult question before [the] Court grants certiorari";68 this process is
sometimes referred to as lower court "percolation."69
Thus, especially (though not only) when another court has already
issued a contrary pronouncement on the same question, issuing a nationwide
injunction causes substantial interference with e power of other courts, and
with the process of helping refine issues that might ultimately be taken up by
the Supreme Court.
A related problem is that nationwide injunctions under such
circumstances also encourage what lawyers call "forum shopping"-that is,
picking a particular place to sue not because of the convenience of the parties
or the location of the witnesses or evidence (which are legitimate factors for
choosing a particular venue), but because of a predicted outcome.
To be fair to district court judges, the Supreme Court has not clearly
and definitively laid out precisely when a district court injunction can extend
beyond the named plaintiffs outside the context of a certified class
action. This absence of clear guidance from the Supreme Court (especially
given the discretion that normally exists with regard to equitable relief like
injunctions) in part explains the many ambitious decisions by district court
judges over the last decade to provide nationwide (or global) relief. Indeed,
65. Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 289 (1952).
66. DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES 217 (Concise 4th ed. 2010).
67. United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 160 (1984).
68. Id.
69. See Vikram David Amar & Courtney G. Joslin, The Problem with the Texas Federal
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such broad injunctions were increasingly common even before President
Trump was elected and his policies began to be litigated in district courts.
And judges used such ambitious injunctions to promote both conservative
and liberal legal results. On the conservative side, consider a ruling in 2016 in
which a Texas federal district court issued a nationwide injunction blocking the
Obama administration from implementing a controversial interpretation of Title
IX, a federal statute banning sex discrimination in schools.0
On the liberal side, consider an instance in which a few same-sex
couples sued California officials several years ago to obtain marriage
licenses even though state law in effect at the time, California Proposition 8,
limited marriage in California to a union between a man and a woman. The
district court judge issued what, on its face, appeared to be a statewide ban
on California officials applying Proposition 8 to any same-sex couples, not
just the plaintiffs before him.7 1 After that ruling came down, I suggested
(relying on the legal principles discussed above) that, absent class action
certification (which might have been plausible but was not sought), the
district court's remedy should have been limited to the plaintiffs in the case.72
Nor are the district judges in some of these cases even spending much
time carefully thinking about how broadly their injunctive relief ought to be
permitted to extend. In the thirty-eight-page ruling in the Texas Title IX case
mentioned above, the district court discussed the propriety of nationwide relief
in just a sentence or two, and cited only one case-a Supreme Court case in
which nationwide relief was upheld, but where there was a class action that
had been certified in which the plaintiff class was itself nationwide.
And in the recent Chicago case involving sanctuary cities, Judge
Leinenweber's decision to apply the injunction nationwide was grounded
primarily on his belief "there is no reason to think that the legal issues
presented in this case are restricted to Chicago" and also on his
understanding that the Supreme Court had recently failed to dissolve a
nationwide injunction when it had a chance, as well as on the fact that "[a]n
injunction more restricted in scope would leave the Attorney General free to
continue enforcing . .. likely invalid conditions."73 As to the first reason, it
is breathtakingly broad and would mean district judges could decide issues
for the whole country anytime purely legal issues were involved. As to the
70. Texas v. United States, No. 7:16-cv-00054 (W.D. Tex. 2016).
71. Order at 136, Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
72. Vikram David Amar, Musings on Some Procedural, But Potentially Momentous, Aspects
of the Proposition 8 Case as it Goes to the Ninth Circuit, FINDLAW, Aug. 13, 2010, http://supreme.
findlaw.com/legal-commentary/musings-on-some-procedural-but-potentially-momentous-aspects
-of-the-proposition-8-case-as-it-goes-to-the-ninth-circuit.html.
73. Memorandum Opinion and Order at 41, City of Chicago v. Sessions (Sept. 15, 2017);
Memorandum Opinion and Order, City of Chicago v. Sessions (Oct. 13, 2017).
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second reason, the Supreme Court when it leaves lower court relief intact in
the context of a request for extraordinary interlocutory review, it does not
affirmatively uphold the nationwide injunction, but simply does not take the
extraordinary step of dissolving it prior to a full consideration of the case on
the merits. And as to the third reason, the obvious counterpoint is the
possibility (described above) that other courts may not end up agreeing with
the judge that the conditions are probably invalid.
Judge Orrick's decision to issue nationwide relief was even more
cavalier. The analysis of remedy was less than one short paragraph, and the
judge cited to a Supreme Court case for the proposition that "[t]he scope of
injunctive relief is dictated by the extent of the violation established, not by
the geographical extent of the plaintiff," failing to mention that in that case
(unlike the case before him) there had been a nationwide class certified, and
thus the Court was simply explaining why nationwide class treatment was
warranted.74 Moreover, and more carelessly still, Judge Orrick's ruling cited
the case as "California v. Yamaski," when the actual case, involving former
Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, Joseph Califano, was Califano
v. Yamaski.i
I mention this variety of settings and relative dearth of analysis because
procedural rules like the breadth of injunctive relief are supposed to be trans-
substantive. When they seem result-oriented (as they sometimes do, given
the cursory analyses offered by district courts), the result is suspicion about
the judicial system.
As noted earlier, I don't fully blame the district court judges; the Supreme
Court is the body that must address this problem and the cynicism it
generates. Again, the Court has not spoken completely clearly, and that has
opened the door to some debatable district court actions. If the Court wants to
move away from the traditional approach and permit more nationwide
injunctions against the federal government even in the absence of class
certification, it should do so explicitly. And if it wants to adhere to the
conventional approach that most analysts see implicit in past Supreme Court
rulings, it should elevate that approach to the level of clear, binding doctrine.
Building the Wall
One important legal line that runs through many of today's federal-state
disputes is that between nonassistance and affirmative interference. Properly
and narrowly understood, the decision of sanctuary jurisdictions to decline




FEDERALISM FRICTION IN THE FIRST YEAR
to lend certain kinds of enforcement assistance to federal immigration
authorities might, as I argued earlier,76 very well be protected by the so-
called anti-commandeering principle reflected in New York v. United States
and Printz v. United States, as long as those cases remain good law and
assuming they apply in full force to the immigration enforcement setting.
But even under the broadest readings of New York and Printz, state and local
authorities have no right to interfere with federal immigration enforcement,
say, by harboring individuals sought by federal authorities, impeding access
to such individuals by federal officials, or providing false information to
federal agents.
In a similar vein, consider California Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye's
complaints about what she saw as federal overreaching with regard to federal
immigration enforcement officials positioning themselves outside state
courts.7 8 Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye was well within her rights (and acting
well within the tradition of the political safeguards of federalism) to voice
such complaints. But if state court marshals were to interfere with or tried to
block federal officials in public areas in and around state courthouse
facilities, such action by state officials would not be protected, and indeed
would conflict with the Constitution's command that federal law (and
enforcement of permissible federal enactments) be supreme and respected
by all state officials.7 9
Another emerging subject that brings up this line between permissible
non-participation and impermissible interference is President Trump's
announced plan to erect a wall along the U.S.-Mexico border. Over the last
76. See supra notes 31-50 and accompanying text.
77. In this regard, it is hard to understand how California officials think they can validly
defend the so-called "Sanctuary State" law, which took effect at the beginning of 2018 and which
purports to punish individual employers who choose to provide information about the immigration
status of their employees to the feds. See, e.g., Angela Hart, 'We Will Prosecute' Employers Who
Help in Immigration Sweeps, California AG Says, SAC. BEE, Jan. 18, 2018, http://www.sacbee.
com/news/politics-govemment/capitol-alert/articlel95434409.html. If an employer voluntarily
chooses to cooperate with federal officials carrying out lawful federal policies, it is hard to see how
a state could punish such an employer, just as a state could not punish persons who choose to tell
federal officials about civil rights violations. See infra notes 84-90 and accompanying text.
78. See generally, Angela Hart, Speaking Out Against Immigration Raids is Her Duty,
California Justice Says, SAC. BEE, Aug. 22, 2017, http://www.sacbee.com/news/politics-govern
ment/capitol-alert/articlel68714487.html.
79. See U.S. CONST. Art. VI, § 2 ("This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which
shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the Judges in every State
shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of any State to contrary
notwithstanding."); U.S. CONST. Art. VI, § 3 ("The ... members of the several State legislatures,
and all executive and judicial officers . . . shall be bound by oath affirmation to support this
Constitution . . . .").
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year, various state and local entities have begun asserting power to push back
against any such wall. Putting aside the cost and logistical feasibility (to say
nothing of the advisability) of the president's plan, what is new and
noteworthy is that various state and local legislative bodies have proposed or
enacted legislation to "divest" from businesses involved with the
construction of any such border wall. In March of 2017, Berkeley,
California, reportedly became the first city in the nation to enact such a
measure.80 The Berkeley version instructs local authorities to identify
companies involved in funding, or building the wall, and to end any contracts
the city has with such entities as soon as practical. How will this enactment
and similar laws passed at the state or local level fare in court? Like all
unripe legal questions, the answer to this one depends on several factors. But
assuming that any federal program to actually build a wall receives the
required approvals from Congress, my view is that state and local
governments should not be permitted to target entities or individuals who are
assisting the federal government in the program.
It is true, of course, that state and local governments have tremendous
control over their own fiscs. State and local governments have more leeway
with regard to their spending than with regard to their regulatory power,
which is why they can give preference to local businesses in public
procurement decisions even as they cannot subject non-local businesses to
discriminatory regulations.8 1 (Thus, it would be obviously illegal if a city
were to say that companies that do business with the federal government on
the wall or more generally cannot do business in, as opposed to with, the
city.) 82 But even as to spending discretion (and putting to one side any First
Amendment type of claim that a federal contractor might make that it is
being discriminated against by state or local authorities based on viewpoint),
the Supreme Court has, I think, clearly suggested that federal supremacy
principles would override local autonomy here.
The basic test as to whether a state or local measure is displaced on
Article VI Supremacy Clause grounds is whether there is any actual conflict
between state and federal laws, or-of crucial importance here-whether
"under the circumstances of [a] particular case, [the challenged state law]
stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full
purposes and objectives of Congress."83 And "[w]hat [constitutes] a
80. See Mary Papenfuss, Berkley Becomes First City to Divest from Border Wall Companies,
HUFF. POST, Mar. 17, 2017, https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entrylberkeley-border-wall-contrac
tors us_58cc7f57e4bObe7ldcf5Od7b.
81. See, e.g., Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1979).
82. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
83. Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 373 (2000).
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sufficient obstacle is a matter of judgment, to be informed by examining the
federal statute as a whole and identifying its purpose and intended effects."84
It was under this test that a unanimous Supreme Court in Crosby v.
National Foreign Trade Council85 at the turn of the century struck down a
Massachusetts law that prohibited the state from doing business with companies
that themselves did business in Myanmar, presumably as an attempt to pressure
Myanmar into human rights reforms. The problem with this law, said the Court,
is that it effectively made it harder for the president, pursuant to authority given
by the Constitution and congressional enactment, to negotiate with Myanmar
and have the nation speak in a single voice.86 And this was true even though
Massachusetts was in some respects acting "passively" by merely selectively
withholding its dollars, and even though Massachusetts, generally speaking, has
broad discretion as to its business partners.
I think the same analysis would likely doom the Berkeley law and
similar enactments. Assuming, again, that the federal wall is something as
to which the president has lawful authority from Congress and/or the
Constitution, there is no doubt that the efforts of cities and states to deter
individuals and companies from working with the federal government would
stand as a nontrivial obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full
purpose of erecting the wall. Indeed, one of the very reasons Berkeley and
other jurisdictions are considering these measures is precisely to make it
harder for the wall to be built. In this respect, the Berkeley law seems easier
to invalidate than the Massachusetts law; in Crosby, the state could at least
make the argument that its goals were generally in alignment with those of
the federal government.
Taking a step back, I think this result makes big-picture federalism
sense. In McCulloch v. Maryland,8 7 Chief Justice John Marshall's opinion
for the Court struck down a tax Maryland targeted at a valid federal entity,
the Bank of the United States, observing that the "power to tax involves the
power to destroy."88 But the power to regulate, employ, and provide benefits
also involves such a power. Imagine that McCulloch had instead involved a
state law that prohibited any persons employed by the Bank of the United
States from ever being eligible to attend public schools, be employed by state
or local government, or receive other public benefits in the state. Certainly,
Maryland could not attack the Bank indirectly by attacking its
people/employees. And if a state can't attack employees of the federal
84. Crosby, 530 U.S. at 373.
85. Id. at 363.
86. Id. at 364.
87. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819).
88. Id. at431.
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government, neither should it be free to attack contractors, who are in effect
substitutes for federal employees themselves.
That leaves us with fiscal discretion as the only possible basis for state
authority in this realm. But as the Crosby case shows, spending power
discretion, while broad, is not immune from a supremacy-focused inquiry into
the potential state spending decisions have for seriously impeding federal
objectives. When state and local governments create policy discriminating
against federal contractors, they are not simply withholding assistance to the
feds, but instead are affirmatively trying to make it harder for the feds to find
third parties to implement national programs.
More generally, I think whether we are talking presidential election
reform or federal-state relations, we should always remember that the rules
and doctrines we forge must apply equally well regardless of which political
party or ideology is in control in the White House. The federalism doctrine, if
it is to have integrity, should take federal supremacy just as seriously as when
the feds seek (whether wisely or not) to build walls as when they seek to tear
walls down, say, by ending racial segregation or facilitating marriage equality.
Tax Return Disclosure
The final topic on which I shall touch are recent proposals-in states
like California and New York-to enact state legislation that seeks to prevent
presidential candidates who fail to disclose tax returns for the five most
recent years prior to the election from having their names appear on the
state's November ballot in 2020 and beyond. The California effort in 2017
has been patterned on a similar proposal being pushed by some legislators in
New York state. The proposal there, dubbed the Tax Returns Uniformly
Made Public (or TRUMP) Act, would require each presidential candidate to
disclose tax returns prior to fifty days before the November election, else
his/her name will not appear on the ballot and the state's electors will be
prohibited by state law from casting their votes for him/her in the so-called
electoral college.89 While many voters (and certainly many journalists) seem
to want access to candidates' tax return information (to see possible conflicts
of interest, levels and directions of charitable giving, relative aggressiveness
in seeking to minimize tax burdens, and so forth) before presidential
elections are held (and were disappointed that Mr. Trump departed from
modern tradition in declining to produce his returns), state legislative
proposals like the TRUMP Act-whose enactment, I should observe, is still
speculative90-raise a number of legal and policy issues.
89. S.B. 26, 2017 Leg., 2017-2018 Sess. (N.Y. 2017).
90. See, e.g., Morris, supra note 7.
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Certainly a big threshold question is whether states have legal authority
to impose such a requirement on presidential candidates as a condition for the
candidates' names appearing on the ballot or their being eligible to be voted
for by the state's electoral college contingent. The New York Times published
an editorial last year expressing its belief-and quoting leading constitutional
scholar Laurence Tribe of Harvard-that laws like the ones being discussed in
New York and California should be upheld in court.91 To be sure, there are
arguments in favor of state authority here (because states have broad leeway
to regulate so-called "ballot access"), but there are also arguments on the other
side, such that prediction is dicey. (And the quote from Professor Tribe did
not indicate anything more than that  state "might be able" to impose the kinds
of tax-return-disclosure requirements being considered.)92
One possible line of constitutional attack against TRUMP Act-like laws
is based on a 1983 Supreme Court case, Anderson v. Celebrezze,93 in which
the Court struck down an Ohio law that required any independent (i.e.,
nonmajor-party) candidate for president to file a statement of candidacy and
nominating petition with state election officials by March 20 in order to be
eligible for inclusion on the November ballot. The Court weighed the state's
interest in having an early filing deadline against the associational interests
of independent candidates and their supporters, especially in the context of
national election where a state's actions can influence a national outcome.
As the Court observed:
[I]n the context of a Presidential election, state-imposed restrictions
implicate a uniquely important national interest. For the President and
the Vice President of the United States are the only elected officials
who represent all the voters in the Nation. Moreover, the impact of
the votes cast in each State is affected by the votes cast for the various
candidates in other States. Thus, in a Presidential election, a State's
enforcement of more stringent ballot access requirements, including
filing deadlines, has an impact beyond its own borders.94
A second line of attack might be premised on United States Term Limits
v. Thornton,95 a 1995 case in which the Court struck down a state law that
prevented congressional candidates who had already served a certain number
of terms in Congress from appearing on congressional election ballots in the
91. Editorial, An Antidote to Donald Trump's Secrecy on Taxes, N.Y. TiMES, Dec. 12, 2016,
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/12/opinion/an-antidote-to-donald-trumps-secrecy-on-taxes.html.
92. Id.
93. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983).
94. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 781.
95. United States Term Limits v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995).
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state, holding that states had no authority to impose additional requirements
beyond those mentioned in the Constitution for the office of U.S.
Representative or Senator, and that preventing the names of long-serving
federal legislators from appearing on the ballot amounted to an additional
requirement for congressional office holding. The same kind of argument
might be made about the TRUMP Act.
But things are not so simple; popular elections for members of the
House and Senate are constitutionally required, but perhaps not so for the
offices of the president and the vice president. For this reason, states may
have much less leeway to regulate congressional elections than they do
presidential selection procedures.
In this regard, it bears noting that seventeen years after Anderson v.
Celebrezze and five years after Thornton, the Court decided Bush v. Gore,96
in which several justices seemed to recognize a much broader authority of
states to administer the presidential selection process. Some of the justices
seemed to indicate that states did not even need to hold elections to gather
popular input before selecting representatives to the so-called electoral
college, and that as long as states were not treating votes from different parts
of the state or for different candidates in a nonuniform way (and a tax-return-
disclosure requirement would apply equally to all candidates and their
supporters), states continue to have broad latitude.
Perhaps Thornton means-whether or not popular elections for
presidential electors are required the way popular elections for members of
Congress are-that, however a state's electoral college contingent is
selected, the state's electoral collegians themselves cannot be required to
observe qualifications for the office of president that go beyond the bare
minima laid out in Article II (age, natural-born citizenship, etc.).97 But that
does not really resolve the question of the information that a state might
require presidential candidates to provide prior to the selection of
presidential electors themselves. Imagine, for example, a state said: "The
state legislature will honor the wishes of the state electorate and choose
electors pledged to support the candidate who receives the most popular
support by statewide voters on Election Day, provided that candidate has
disclosed his or her tax returns (in particular ways elsewhere defined). If the
candidate with the most popular support has not disclosed his/her tax returns,
then the state legislature is free to select electors pledged to vote for a
96. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
97. This assumes that electoral collegians are constitutionally entitled to independence, a
question that I think is not as easy as many assume. See Vikram David Amar, Fixing the Problem
ofFaithless Electors, JUSTIA, Nov. 18, 2016, https://verdict.justia.com/2016/11/18/fixing-problem
-faithless-electors.
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different presidential candidate." It is not clear to me states lack the power
to adopt such a scheme under the reasoning of at least many of the Justices
in Bush v. Gore, and if I'm right about that, then a great deal turns on how
cleverly states implement a defacto requirement of tax return disclosure.
Moving beyond legal validity, are laws like the TRUMP Act a good
idea? That too, depends. If only blue states like New York and California
adopt such laws, then only Democratic candidates will have meaningful
pressure on them to disclose their tax returns. To be blunt, nothing in the
presidential election in 2016 would have changed if the name of Donald
Trump (or of electors pledged or inclined to support him) had not appeared
on California's or New York's November ballots. And that fact was known
from the beginning of the election cycle. So, as with so many presidential
election reforms, for this one to have any beneficial real-world effect, it
would have to be embraced by either a mix of blue and red states or at least
a number of swing states where neither party can feel assured of a victory.
Or it would have to be implemented at the primary election stage, when
fewer candidates could ignore it.
And ballot access regulations such as the TRUMP Act could themselves
complicate other well-intentioned and viable reform efforts, like the National
Popular Vote ("NPV") Compact plan about which I have written a great deal
in on-line and academic commentary.98 For any effort by a group of states
to collectively allocate their electors to the national popular vote winner
(regardless of who got more votes within each of the signatory states) to
work, we need some reliable way of discerning voter preferences in all fifty
states (and District of Columbia), so that the nominal national popular vote
winner is indeed the choice of the greatest number of American voters. But
if voters in some states are effectively prevented from registering their
preferences (because of something like the TRUMP Act), then the title of
national popular vote winner is deprived of much of its democratic
legitimacy. (For example, imagine that Mr. Trump's name did not appear
on the New York and California ballots in 2020, and that he was beaten in
the national popular vote tally by a relatively narrow margin; surely no one
could think he meaningfully "lost" the national popular vote, since he no
doubt would have received several millions of votes in California and New
York, even though he was likely to lose those states, had he been on the
ballots there.)
98. See, e.g., Vikram David Amar, Oregon May Become the First State to Use Direct
Democracy to Join the National Popular Vote Agreement Plan, JUSTIA, June 1, 2017, https:/
/verdict.justia.com/2016/11/18/fixing-problem-faithless-electors; The Case for Reforming
Presidential Elections, supra note 30.
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I have written in a 2011 Georgetown Law Journal article99 that if
enough states do adopt the National Popular Vote plan such that states might
begin allocating electors according to the plan, then Congress has the power
to and should adopt a law providing for more national uniformity to discern
a meaningful national vote tally. Proposals like the TRUMP Act convince
me all the more of the importance of federal legislation in this realm if and
when states making up 270 or more electors sign onto the NPV plan.
Conclusion
Federalism is important and complicated stuff. And it is likely to
become more so, on both fronts, as the disputes I have addressed here
continue to make their way up the legislative, executive, and judicial ladders.
Scholars and jurists would do well to bone up on the basics, and also the
nuances, of federalism theory and doctrine.
99. The Case for Reforming Presidential Elections, supra note 30.
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